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TERMINATION OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES
NOT TO COMPETE FOR
THE FIRM'S CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS
W HILE THE NATURE of the so-called fiduciary duty1 of a
director or corporate officer to his corporation, of a partner to
his partners, and of an employee to his employers has received a good
deal of attention,2 there has been little discussion of how, when, under
what circumstances, and in what respects it comes to an end.' This
paucity of treatment and the resultant vagueness in this area largely
reflects an unresolved conflict between two fundamental, yet antitheti-
cal, values, each accepted as valid in a competitive society. The first
is the desirability of having a business fiduciary discipline his acquisi-
tive instincts so that they will operate vicariously for the benefit, not
of himself, but of the firm.4 Were this the only consideration, the
problem would disappear. A fiduciary would be forbidden to compete
for the firm's accounts, if not forever, then for a reasonable time after
the termination of the fiduciary relationship. But there is a second
value-the desirability of leaving every economically productive person
free to use his accumulated knowledge and his abilities to advance his
own interests.' If such competition were flatly forbidden, the results,
in a competitive society, would not be entirely beneficial.
In general, this fiduciary duty is said to last while the relationship
that gives rise to it lasts; in general, it is said to come to an end when
the fiduciary leaves the firm.6 But there is no sharp dividing line.7 In
Although this duty is analogous in only some respects to that of a trustee to the
beneficiaries of a trust, in the interest of brevity the word "fiduciary" will be substi-
tuted hereinafter for the phrase "he who owes a duty to a business associate," and the
word "firm" for "the person, persons or corporate entity to whom the duty is owed."
2 For general discussion, see 3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 861, 86z (2947);
CRANE, PARTNERSHIP § 68 (2d ed. 1952); MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP §§ 170, 171 , 172
(2d ed. 1920) ; POLLOCK, PARTNERSHIP § 30 (isth ed. 1952).2 See, e.g., Note, 64 A.L.R. 782, 789 (19-9).
'For general discussion, see Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary
Duties of Cororate Managers Practicable, 2 U. OF CHI. L. REV. x94 (93).
'For brief general discussion, see LATTY, INTRODUCrION To BUSINESS AsSoCIA-
TIONS 402, n. 6 (1951).
' See authorities cited note 2 supra.
7 E.g., Stem v. Warren, 227 N. Y. 538, 125 N.E. 8x (192o), notes 12, 22 and
46 infra (fiduciary duty survives dissolution of partnership by death of partner).
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borderline situations the courts have ostensibly imposed liability for
breach of the duty on the basis of (a) whether there was any disloyal
conduct by the fiduciary before he terminated the relationship, and (b)
whether his conduct showed "good faith" toward the firm.' But
neither test, as applied, is wholly satisfactory. An examination of
the cases suggests, with respect to the first, that there are certain types
of duty which persist even after the relationship has been terminated-
and others from which the fiduciary may be discharged if he makes a
full disclosure to his firm of his intention to compete, even before the
association has come to an end. As to the second test, "good faith"
does not appear to be used as a term of art by the courts, but rather
to characterize approved behavior.
The unsatisfactory results of attempting to apply the "termination"
test appear in the long line of partnership cases, where a partner,
anticipating the dissolution of the partnership, has sought to capture
'E.g., McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. io 3 (8th Cir. 19o6), notes z3, 24
and 42 infra (constructive trust imposed where the managing director of a corpora-
tion operating a theatre under lease secretly obtained a renewal of the lease in his own
name) ; Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931), notes 12, 23
and 49 infra (accounting for profits granted where the president of a cab company
organized a competing company and enticed drivers from his firm); Williamson v.
Monroe, 1o1 Fed. 322 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 9oo), notes 23, 24 and 46 infra (managing
partner required to account for profits where he agreed to secure a contract for the
firm but secretly took it on his own behalf)5 Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney,
305 Mass. 645, 26 N.E.2d 324 (194o), notes z2, 13, 23, 24, 46 and 49 infra (tort
damages awarded where the managing directors of an insolvent milk company persuaded
drivers and customers to transfer to a new firm they had formed); Horn Pond Ice
Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, x66 N.E. 640 (1929), notes 12, 40 and 46 infra
(constructive trust imposed on lease taken on ice pond by employees who knew their
employer was negotiating for the lease); Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, 100
N.E. 611 (1913), notes 2g, 24 and 46 infra (accounting for profits decreed where
partner obtained on his own behalf renewal of agency contract held by partnership
to commence at termination of partnership)5 Sorenson v. Nielson, 240 N.Y. Supp.
250 (Sup. Ct. 1930), notes 12, 20, 24 and 44 infra (constructive trust imposed on
import account of the partnership secretly obtained for future employer by partner);
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, x64 N.E. 545 (1928), notes 23, 24 and 32
infra (constructive trust imposed on profits from a lease renewal secretly obtained by
a joint venturer to commence at the termination of the joint venture) ; Storey v. Ex-
celsior Shook & Lumber Co., 198 App. Div. 5o5, 19o N.Y. Supp. 614. (ist Dep't
1921), notes 12, 22, 23, 39 and 47 infra (injunction granted against former em-
ployees who appropriated records from the files of their employer and while still
employed diverted orders to their new firm) Robb v. Green [1895] 2 Q.B. 2, notes
22 and 34 infra (damages and injunction granted where employee, while still em-
ployed, copied out his master's order book to make use of it after leaving his employ-
ment); Wessex Dairies Ltd. v. Smith [1935] 2 K.B. 8o, note 5, infra (damages
granted where milkman solicited customers before leaving his employer's service and
setting up for himself).
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a partnership opportunity.' The courts have carefully tried to draw
the line between duty and no-duty on the basis of whether the rela-
tionship had been terminated at the time the opportunity was captured.
But they appear to be manipulating the concepts of "dissolution" and
"termination" in order to justify results reached on other grounds.
Thus, for example, it has been held that, although dissolution of a
partnership at will has been proposed, if negotiations for a final settle-
ment are still in progress, there has been no "termination," and a
renewal by one partner in his own name of a lease on partnership
premises is a breach of fiduciary duty for which a constructive trust may
be imposed. 10 Yet, in another case, frequently cited with approval,
where the partnership owned the majority interest in a small, closely
held corporation, the defendant partner escaped imposition of a con-
structive trust on minority shares secretly purchased by him on the
ground that there had been a "termination" upon defendant's announce-
ment of his intention to dissolve the partnership, although the actual
winding up process continued for some months after the occurrence of
the defendant's alleged breach of duty." In the first case, it should
be noted, however, the remaining partners were offered no opportunity
to acquire the lease for the partnership; in the second, they had made
an unsuccessful attempt to purchase the stock in question before the
defendant secured it. Thus, in the first case, the fiduciary and the firm
did not compete upon an equal footing; in the second, they did.
Again, courts have repeatedly penalized the fiduciary who has
successfully competed against his firm by either assessing damages
against him or imposing a constructive trust upon the whole of his
gain on the ground that a part of the conduct complained of took place
before the termination of the relationship.' 2 Even where the operations
'For discussion, see Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1193 (194).
"0Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N.Y. 357 (1873).
"
1Bayer v. Bayer, z15 App. Div. 454, 214 N.Y. Supp. 322 (ist Dep't 1976),
notes zi, 29 and 31 infra.
1 2 E.g., Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931), note 8
supra, notes 23 and 49 infra; Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney, 305 Mass. 645,
z6 N.E.zd 324 (1940), note 8 supra, notes 13, 23, 24, 46 and 49 infra; Horn Pond
Ice Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640 (1929), note 8 supra, notes 4o and
46 infra; Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Forslund, 225 Mo. App. 262, 29
S.W.2d 165 (1930), notes 22, 23, 38 and 47 infra (the president of a firm obtained
agreement from suppliers that they would supply him when he went into business for
himself); Sorenson v. Nielson, 24o N.Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1930), note 8 supra,
notes 20, 24 and 44 infra; Storey v. Excelsior Shook & Lumber Co., 198 App. Div.
505, 19o N.Y. Supp. 614 (st Dept 1921), note 8 supra, notes 22, 23, 39 and 47
infra; Stem v. Warren, Z27 N.Y. 538, 125 N.E. 811 (192o), note 7 supra, notes 22
and .46 infra (a letter written by surviving partner charged with winding up partner-
ship affairs suggesting that partnership contract be cancelled and renegotiated with
himself).
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have been almost simultaneous, as where the ingenious executives of
a milk company resigned on a Saturday afternoon, telling its drivers
to report Monday morning at a new wharf at which they were to pick
up milk from a competing supplier to deliver to the firm's customers, a
constructive trust has been imposed on the ground that there had been
a "plotting" by the fiduciaries before termination of the employment.13
Yet, had the executives discussed among themselves, while still em-
ployed and without the knowledge of the firm, the possibility of found-
ing a competing company by more orthodox methods, it is difficult to
suppose that a court would have held that they had been "plotting"
against the firm, even though competition from the new company when
formed might have seriously cut into the profits from the old.'4 It
is suggested that the difficulty was that the fiduciaries in question had
sewed up the employees and supplier of the firm before the firm had
an opportunity to approach them. The parties were not upon an equal
footing.
A recent case' 5 raises the problem in dramatic form. The president
of the plaintiff corporation, an incorporated advertising agency, which
he had founded and had built up to its present success, had been guilty
of certain behavior lapses at his office, at business functions and during
interviews with actual and prospective customers. There had been
complaints; several accounts had withdrawn from the agency. At
first, the president refused to resign, and the defendants, a group of
top employees who were also officers and directors of the firm, an-
nounced that they would themselves leave the agency unless he did
so. He subsequently agreed with the defendants that he would resign
and that they should buy him out; but negotiations for the purchase
broke down-apparently over the question of whether payment should
be made in cash or from profits. The defendants then tendered their
resignations as officers and directors, but remained, at the request of
the president, to wind up the firm's affairs.
They now began to sound out the firm's accounts and its key sub-
ordinates with a view toward forming a new firm, and, when the
feasibility of their plan became apparent, notified the president that
they had been doing so. A new firm was formed, and, at the end of
their terminal period of employment, all the individual defendants
except two joined it, taking with them eight accounts, representing over
"3Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney, 305 Mass. 645, 26 N.E.2d 324 (1940),
notes 8 and iz supra, notes 23, 24) 46 and 49 irlfra.
"'E.g., Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941), notes
22 and 30 infra.
"'Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 281 App. Div. 622, 1z N.Y.S.2d 107 (Ist Dep't
1953), vzodified and aff'd, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1954).
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half the old firm's total "billings," or advertising expenditures which
it handled, and 71 of its 132 employees, including all heads of depart-
ments. Neither employees nor accounts were bound by contract to
the plaintiff corporation which now sued for damages, alleging a breach
of fiduciary duty. A judgment upon a verdict of $300,000 was affirmed
by a divided court in the Appellate Division, and appeal was taken to
the New York Court of Appeals where it was modified and affirmed.
It is difficult to accept the fact that some of the "disloyal" conduct
of the defendant fiduciaries took place before the end of their terminal
period of employment and after they had given notice as an adequate
basis for the imposition of liability in this case. Under the circum-
stances, it would appear that the defendants could have achieved sub-
stantially the same result liad they resigned in a body before approach-
ing any of the firm's customers. Nor does their "bad faith," the fact
that they "held a gun' n 6 to the head of the president of the firm, supply
a satisfying rationale for the decision. They could reasonably have
believed, that he was wrecking the enterprise in which they had a joint
interest and could not be persuaded to accept reasonable proposals to
improve the situation.
What does justify the decision is the fact that the defendants did
not compete with the plaintiff upon an equal footing. They did not
disclose to the president their intention to compete until they were
sure of its success. Further, they were arguably under an extraordinary
duty toward him, in view of both his incapacity and the fact that they
comprised the bulk of the firm's management personnel. Most im-
portant of all, they succeeded, in the language of the Appellate Divi-
sion, in carving out a new business from the old without paying for it.17
It is perhaps significant that the damages awarded by the trial court
approximated the amount by which the sale price negotiated between
the parties exceeded the sum of its cash assets-which is perhaps as close
as it is possible to estimate the fair market value of the goodwill appro-
priated by the defendants.
It would seem, then, that there is need of a new statement of the
rule under which liability is imposed upon the departing business
associate for violation of his fiduciary duty not to compete for the
firm's customers and suppliers. Such a statement should be at once
more flexible and more precise than that based upon the questions
whether the conduct complained of took place before or after termina-
tion of the relationship, or whether the departing associate acted in
"good faith." The rule which seems implicit in the decisions is that the
parties must be on an equal footing to compete.
aId. at z8x App. Div. 622, -, zi N.Y.S.2d 107, 115 (Ost Dep't 953).
"I1d. at 281 App. Div. 622, -, 121 N.Y.S.2d 107, 11o (ist Dep't 1953).
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Whether there has been full disclosure of intention to compete is
the first and most important test applied to determine whether the
associates were in fact competing on such equal footing. Dicta in
several cases imply that, if the fiduciary has made a full disclosure to
the firm, there are types of assets, at least, which the firm already owns
or which it has a reasonable expectancy of acquiring, which he can try
to obtain for himself even before he has severed the fiduciary rela-
tionship. Thus, in holding a partner constructive trustee of the rever-
sion on a lease of the premises occupied by the partnership, the court
remarked that,
* . . if he designed to act independently of the complainant
he should have declared his intention.'
And where a partner renewed on his own behalf an agency agreement
which had been the principal asset of the partnership, the court said
that,
* . . if the defendant was unwilling to continue in business
with the plaintiff after the expiration of their copartnership agree-
ment, he should at least have notified him of that fact, and have
given him an equal opportunity to obtain an agency agreement
at the expiration of the existing one.' 9
In the same vein, although holding a partner liable for secretly solicit-
ing the firm's one profitable account before resigning, the court observed
that,
* .. It may be a different result would ensue if Nielson had
acted differently, if he had been candid instead of silent.2°
Other tests of equal footing appear to be (i) whether the asset
appropriated by the departing defendant fiduciary lay within the ambit
of his duty at all;21 (2) whether he made use of documents or specific
18 Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N.Y. 236, 239 (1853).
"
0Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, 305, ioo N.E. 6sx, 61z (913), note 8
supra, notes 24 and 46 infra.
"0Sorenson v. Nielson, 24o N.Y. Supp. 25o, 257 (Sup. Ct. i93o), notes 8 and 12
supra, notes 24 and 44 infra.
2' Greer v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (i929) (a director owes no duty
to the corporation to refrain, after resigning, from entering a similar field of business)
Bayer v. Bayer, 215 App. Div. 454, 214 N.Y. Supp. 322 (ist Dep't 1926), note iT
supra, notes 29 and 31 infra; Bevan v. Webb [19o5] z Ch. 6zo (a partner may
acquire the reversion of a lease held by the partnership) ; Trimble v. Goldberg (19o6)
A.C. 494 (a partner may purchase on his individual behalf property owned by a syndi-
cate although the partnership was formed to acquire shares in the syndicate); Com-
ment, Corporations: The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunities, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 188
(1943); Notes, 39 COL. L. REv. 219 (i939); 54 HARV. L. REv. 1191 (594i); 50
MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1952).
1954]
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information, e.g., customer lists, specifications, et cetera, which he ob-
tained in his capacity as a fiduciary; 2  (3) whether he was under an
extraordinary duty, perhaps as managing partner or similarly charged
corporate officer; 23 and (4) whether he succeeded in appropriating all,
or substantially all, of the firm's goodwill. 4
2 Consumer's Company v. William H. Parker, 227 Ill. App. 552 (1923) (con-
structive trust imposed on lease on employer's premises obtained by employee who
learned in the course of his employment of negotiations for renewal of tile lease) ;
Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.zd 704 (1941), note 14 supra,
note 3o infra; Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Forslund, 225 Mo. App. 26z,
29 S.W.zd 165 (930), note 12 supra, notes 23, 38 and 47 infra; Storey v. Excelsior
Shook & Lumber Co., 198 App. Div. 5o5, 19o N.Y. Supp. 6t4 (ist Dep't 192),
notes 8 and 12 supra, notes 23, 39 and 47 infra; Stem v. Warren, 227 N.Y.
538, 125 N.E. 81i (1920), notes 7 and 12 supra, note 46 infra; New York
Auto v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y. Supp. 781 (1905), aff'd, 134 App. Div. 908,
118 N.Y. Supp. 1127 ( 4 th Dep't 19o9), aff'd, 202 N.Y. 557, 95 N.E. 1134 (1911),
notes 28 and 37 infra (after leaving the firm, an employee may not make use of draw-
ings and diagrams prepared in the course of his employment) ; Robb v. Green [x895]
z Q.B. 22, note 8 supra, note 34 infra; Lamb v. Evans [1893] 1 Ch. 2z8, note 35
infra (a writer hired to compose captions for a publisher's guide may not sell the same
captions to a subsequent employer).
23McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (8th Cir. 19o6), note 8 supra, notes
24 and 4z infra; Williamson v. Monroe, ioi Fed. 522 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 19oo), note
8 supra, notes 24 and 46 infra; Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F,2d 236 (N.D.
Cal. 1931), notes 8 and x2 supra, note 49 infra; Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney,
305 Mass 645, 26 N.E.2d 324 (1940), notes 8, 12 and 13 supra, notes 24, 46 and
49 infra; Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Forslund, 225 Mo. App. z6z, z9
S.W.2d 16s (1930), notes 12 and zz supra, notes 38 and 47 infra; Meinhard v. Sal-
mon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), note 8 supra, notes 24. and 32 jil ra;
Storey v. Excelsior Shook & Lumber Co., 198 App. Div. 5o5, 19o N.Y. Supp. 6x4
(1st Dep't 192z), notes 8, 12 and 22 supra, notes 39 and 47 infra; Clegg v. Edmond-
son, 8 De G.M.& G. 787, 44 Eng. Rep. 595 (1857), notes 24 and 45 infra (giving
notide of dissolution of the partnership does not discharge the managing partner from
liability when he subsequently acquires the mining lease formerly held by the partner-
ship); Cook v. Deeks [19l6] i A.C. 554, notes 43 and 46 infra (the managing direc-
tors of a construction firm are not discharged from liability by a stockholder's vote
ratifying their acquisition on their individual behalf of a contract which was a reason-
able business opportunity of the corporation).
2'McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (8th Cir. 19o6), notes 8 and 23
supra, note 42 infra; Williamson v. Monroe, ioi Fed. 322 (C.C.W.D. Ark. i9oo),
notes 8 and 23 supra, note 46 infra (contracting partnership formed to build section
of railway roadbed, one partner appropriates contract for further section); Barden
Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney, 305 Mass. 645, 26 N.E.2d 324 (i94o), notes 8, 12,
13 and 23 supra, notes 46 and 49 infra; Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, ioo N.E.
611 (1913) , notes 8 and 19 supra, note 46 infra (agency contract comprising chief
asset of partnership); Sorenson v. Nielson, 24o N.Y. Supp. 25o (Sup. Ct. 1930), notes
8, 12 and 20 supra, note 44 infra (sole profitable account of partnership) , Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), notes 8 and 23 supra, note 32 infra;
Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 De G.M.&G. 787, 44 Eng. Rep. 993 (1857), note 23 supra,
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Did the appropriation lie within the ambit of the fiduciary's duty
at all? Obviously, the outgoing fiduciary cannot take the firm's "prop-
erty" with him, 25 e.g., the desk at which he worked. But it will not
do simply to label goodwill as "property," 6 for the outgoing fiduciary
is privileged, in the ordinary case, to quit, walk down the street and
into a telephone booth, call up the firm's best customer whose account
he has been handling, tell the customer that he is now at liberty and
going into business for himself, and ask for the customer's account.
Even before the fiduciary leaves the firm, the ambit of his duty
is not unlimited. Thus, a director may take advantage of a business
opportunity, so long as it is not a "corporate opportunity"32 7 and,
absent specific contract, an employee's invention of a machine creates in
his employer no rights (except shop rights-the right of the employer
to use the machine in his business without paying a royalty) even though
he has worked on his employer's time or made use of his employer's
materials or facilities.2" Similarly, a partner may engage in business
which is "outside the scope of the partnership."' Even the purchase by
the fiduciary, while still with the firm, of a presently non-competing
business, with the purpose to turn it into a competing one, has been held
not to be a breach of duty. 0 Likewise, the purchase by a partner of
the minority interest in a manufacturing corporation, in which the
partnership held the majority of the stock, does not necessarily re-
note 45 infra. But see Washer v. Seager, 272 App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Ist
Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 918, 79 N.E.2d 745 (1948) (firm was awarded its
principal supply contract on the basis of defendant partner's skill and experience. De-
fendant partner obtains supplier's agreement to serve new firm he plans to enter after
partners quarrel but before dissolution is completed. Held, no liability. Both partners
had full opportunity to approach supplier).
"For general discussion, see note i supra; for more detailed consideration, see
Notes, 39 COL. L. REv. 2i9 (i939) ; 54 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1941).
2' For a discussion of goodwill as property, see Crane, Partnership Good Will, 18
VA. L. REV. 651 (193) ; Foreman, Conflicting Theories of Good Will, 22 COL. L.
REV. 638 (1922) i Laube, Good Will in Professional Partnerships, I2 CORNELL L. Q.
303 (1926)5 Wright, The Nature and Basis of Legal Goodwill, 24 ILL L. REV. 20
(1929).
" See note 21 supra.
"New York Auto Co. v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y. Supp. 785 (905),
aff'd, 134- App. Div. 9o8, iiS N.Y. Supp. 1127 (4 th Dep't igo9), aff'd, 202 N.Y.
557, 95 N.E. 1134 (i911), note 22 supra, note 37 infra; Gemco Engineering v. Hen-
derson, 82 Ohio App. 324, 7 N.E.2d 7412 (1947).
20Bayer v. Bayer, 215 App. Div. 454, 214 N.Y. Supp. 322 (ist Dep't 1926),
notes 11 and 21 supra, note 31 infra (purchase by a partner of minority share in a
small closed corporation in which majority shares are held by partnership held outside
the scope of the partnership).
"Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.zd 704 (i9¢x), notes 14 and
22 supra.
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quire the imposition of a constructive trust-' Yet the ambit of the
duty is wide, and in the leading case of Meinhard v. Salmon,32 where
a partnership had been formed for the purpose of managing a lease of
a particular parcel of real estate, it was extended to cover a new lease,
although such new lease was to begin at the termination of the partner-
ship agreement and to cover a tract several times larger than, and at
a rent several times that of, the original parcel.
Once the appropriation has been determined to lie within the ambit
of the duty, it is cases which turn on lack of full disclosure which sug-
gest most strongly that termination of the relationship is not a reliable
test of liability.
The requirement that the fiduciary shall not use confidential in-
formations and papers which he has acquired in his capacity as a
fiduciary to help him obtain control of an asset of the firm likewise
applies both before and after termination of the relationship and re-
lates to the one well settled area of this branch of law. The confiden-
tial information which the fiduciary may not use includes the list of
mail order customers of a breeder of game fowl, which has been built
up over a period of years by the proprietor 31 section headings for an
international "Guide to Merchants and Manufacturers," composed by
the fiduciary while employed by the firm, and later appropriated by
him for use in a rival publication; 5 the name by which a firm has been
identified to its customers, even though the name may be that of the
withdrawing fiduciary;3" models, patterns and drawings made by the
fiduciary while employed to perfect an automobile design (although
apparently he may use the basic idea) ;3 plans, specifications and lists
of customers taken from the files of an agency selling pumping machin-
"
1Bayer v. Bayer, z5 App. Div. 454, 214 N.Y. Supp. 322 (st Dep't 1926). It
should be noted, however, that the partnership here was in process of dissolution,
and the trial court found as a fact that the other partners had notice of the defendant's
intention to acquire the stock.
32 249 N.Y. 458, z64 N.E. 545 (19z8), notes 8 and 23 nupra.
"See Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of Knowledge Gained while a Director,
9 Miss. L.J. 427 (1937).
", Robb v. Green [1895] 2 Q.B. 2, notes 8 and 22 supra.3 Lamb v. Evans [x893] i Ch. z18, note 22 supra. The headings were held not
subject to copyright, so that no recovery for infringement was possible. Lord Justice
Kay, in the course of his opinion, stated the rule, at p. 236, as including every case
(cwhere a man has obtained materials while he was in the position of agent for another-
materials which were obtained by him in the course of that agency and were to be
used for the purposes for which his principal had employed him."
"
6 Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge, 145 Cal. 380, 78 Pac. 879 (904).
"
7New York Auto Co. v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y. Supp. 781 (1905), aff'd,
134 App. Div. 908, 118 N.Y. Supp. 1127 ( 4 th Dep't 19o9), aff'd, 2oz N.Y. 557,
95 N.E. 1134 (i9ii), notes 22 and 28 supra.
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ery ; 38 and data on the type, quality and quantity of lumber sold by
a lumber company to each of its customers. 9 It does not include the
list of customers of an ice company operating in a small town, which is
little more than a list of its inhabitants."' This test has been roughly
summarized by saying that the fiduciary can carry with him any confi-
dential information which he can remember but may take nothing which
has been written down.41
Although it is impossible to explain this test on the basis of the
termination rule, perhaps the underlying rationale is that the fiduciary
has already had an opportunity to ingratiate himself with the customer
or supplier in question, and that to permit him to retain actual notes,
memoranda, and the like when he leaves the firm will give him an
undue advantage-place him on better than an equal footing-in com-
peting with it afterward.
For practical reasons, the last two tests outlined above, ie., the
degree to which the fiduciary has been entrusted with the management
of the firm and the extent of the appropriation in relation to the whole
goodwill of the firm, are often applicable in the same case. The manag-
ing director of a small dosed corporation whose sole asset was a theatre
lease was held constructive trustee of a renewal for the benefit of his
co-founder's daughter and legatee, resident of a foreign country.
42
Similarly, where the managing directors of a construction firm agreed
to get rid of their passive associate and took a contract in their own
name for a section of railroad track beyond the one the firm was build-
ing, they were held constructive trustees for the firm.4 And where
a partner in an importing firm went to a competitor, taking with him
the firm's one profitable import account, he and the competitor were
held constructive trustees for the benefit of the firm.44  Likewise, in
an early English lease case in which the "equal footing" test is ex-
plicitly laid down, the acquisition by a managing partner of the mining
lease constituting the sole asset of the firm was said in dictum to be a
breach of fiduciary duty so serious that it could not have been cured
"8 Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Forslund, Z25 Mo. App. 262, 29 S.W.zd
x65 (1930), notes 12, 22 and 23 supra, note 47 infra.
"' Storey v. Excelsior Shook & Lumber Co., 198 App. Div. 505, 19o N.Y. Supp.
614 (st Dep't 1g2), notes 8, 12, 22 and 23 supra, note 47 infra.
" Horn Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, i66 N.E. 640 (1929), notes 8
and 12 supra, note 46 infra.
41 LA=rr, op. cit. supra note 5 at 402.
42 McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (8th Cir. 19o6), notes 8, 23 and 24
supra.
"Cook v. Deeks [x916] i A.C. 554, note 23 supra, note 46 infra.
"' Sorenson v. Nielson, 24o N.Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1930), notes 8, 12, 2o and
24 supra; see Note, 30 COL. L. REV. 897 (1930).
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by disclosure 5 Significantly, then, in Duane Jones v. Burke, consider-
able emphasis was laid in the decisions of both the Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals on the extent of the appropriation.
To sum up, then, should a business fiduciary plan to leave his firm
with a view to competing with it for the accounts of its customers and
suppliers, a critical period, during which he is held to a high standard
of duty to his firm begins to run. It does not end until that time after
he is completely and publicly on his own, when the fact that he was
formerly associated with the firm ceases to be of substantial weight
with such customers and suppliers in deciding where to place their ac-
counts. The rule which purports to impose liability where there has
been self serving conduct on the part of the fiduciary before termina-
tion of the relationship deals with one portion of this period only. Such
a rule is on the one hand insufficient to control the managing fiduciary,
who may be able to appropriate the bulk of the firm's goodwill even
after he has left it, and, on the other, too heroic for the ordinary man,
who must make sure before he leaves one firm that a place in another
is ready for him. Mechanical application of the termination rule may
leave the former free, and do little more than educate the latter in
techniques of evasion.
A close examination of the cases suggests that the courts are aware
of this difficulty, and that, while, ostensibly, they have imposed liability
for violation of the termination rule, they are, in fact, basing their
decisions upon the necessity to place the parties upon an equal footing.
Wherever liability has been imposed, it will appear that the fiduciary
has sought to obtain an unequal advantage in the competition. He has
lulled the firm into inaction by concealing his intention to compete, 40
he has made misstatements to the customer or supplier about the firm's
stability,47 or has simply sewed them up for himself before the firm
was aware that it should take action on its own behalf.48  Without
,' Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 De G.M.& G. 787, 807, 44 Eng. Rep. 593, 6oz (1857),
notes 23 and 24. supra.
" See, among others, Williamson v. Monroe, ioi Fed. 322 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 9oo),
notes 8, 23 and 24 supra; Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney, 305 Mass. 645, z6
N.E.2d 324 (1940), notes 8, 1Z, 13, 23 and 24 supra, note 49 infra; Horn Pond Ice
Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 64o (x929), notes 8, x7 and 40 supra;
Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, ioo N.E. 611 (1913), notes 8, x9 and 24 supra,
Stem v. Warren, 227 N.Y. 538, 125 N.E. 8S1 (197o), notes 7, 12 and 22 supra;
Cook v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554, notes 23 and 43 supra.
'7 Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Forslund, 225 Mo. App. 267, 29 S.W.zd
165 (193o), notes 12, 22, 23 and 38 supra; Storey v. Excelsior Shook & Lumber Co.,
198 App. Div. 505, 19o N.Y. Supp. 614 (ist Dep't 192), notes 8, 12, 22, 23 and
39 suPra.
" See cases cited in note 46 supra.
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notifying the firm that he was doing so, he has used his daily contact
with the firm's employees to influence them to leave it and come with
him,49 he has borrowed the firm's records and used them without per-
mission or payment," he has become identified with the firm in the
minds of its customers, and has made use of that identification to per-
suade them to follow him en masse to a new firm.51
The simplest and primary technique for placing the parties upon
an equal footing, and one frequently suggested in dicta, is to require
full disclosure by the fiduciary, both of his intention to compete and
of the manner in which he intends to do so. 2 The requirement of
disclosure could be enforced by creating a presumption in favor of the
firm that there had been a breach of duty whenever the departing
fiduciary took with him the account of a supplier or customer and by
placing upon the fiduciary the burden of overcoming the presumption
by proving a full disclosure. Where the fiduciary has made use of
confidential information or papers, where he is a managing director,
or for some other reason in a position of unusual trust, or where the
appropriation extends to a substantial portion of the firm's accounts,
the presumption might be made conclusive and the fiduciary forbidden
to compete unless he paid for what he took. Such a rule would reach
the same result as that in Duane Jones v. Burke, and would, by making
explicit what already appears to be implicit in the reasoning of courts
dealing with this problem, prepare a more flexible and accurate tool
for the court of tomorrow.
JANET HART
40Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931), notes 8, 1z and
23 supra; Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney, 305 Mass. 645, 26 N.E.zd 324
(94o), notes 8, 12, I3 23, 24 and 46 supra.
"0 For citations, see notes 22 and 34-41 supra.
"' Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 281 App. Div. 62z, 121 N.Y.S.2d 107 (ist Dep't
1953), -nodified and aff'd, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1954), notes 15, 16 and 17 supra;
Wessex Dairies Ltd. v. Smith [1935] 2 K.B. 8o, note 8 supra.
"See notes 18-20 supra.
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